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This research explores the topic of labor migration in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states
– Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates -- and seeks to
determine how the subjugation of migrant laborers is initiated and perpetuated. The kafala
(sponsorship) system has played a central role in the rapid economic development in the GCC
states. Though it has allowed the Gulf States to obtain the resources necessary to develop
both economically and cosmetically, the system has had an array of undesirable byproducts
that have significantly altered the texture of Gulf societies. The kafalasystem promotes the
rapid influx of migrants to meet the labor demand while simultaneously subjugating this
imported population through its lax regulations and exclusion from the legal framework in
Gulf States. As a result, the Gulf has witnessed an emergence of multi-tiered societies where
locals are situated in the top tier and migrant populations consistently occupy the lowest
rungs of society. The kafala system has produced structural inequalities in Gulf States and
has resulted in grave human rights abuses against migrant laborers. Today, the effects of the
kafala system are visible in every aspect of Gulf society. A case study of Dubai, United Arab
Emirates is used to examine how legal norms produce and interact with the lived experiences
of South Asian migrant laborers. The case study discusses how the kafala system unfolds in
one of the most iconic cities in the world and seeks to articulate the lived experiences that
are often omitted from modernization narratives.
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1 Introduction
Just a few decades ago, the Arabian Gulf was a vast stretch of desert. The economy for
many Gulf cities was based on regional trade, with the city structurally centered around trading
ports. The Gulf as we know it today, featuring futuristic skylines and unparalleled luxury,
is a result of extremely rapid and expansive development plans that were financed through
oil wealth. Because Gulf countries hosted small local population sizes, they found that they
could not supply the labor that these projects demanded. At the time, the Gulf already hosted
significant migrant populations. As the demand for labor increased, migration evolved to be the
most efficient solution for balancing the labor deficit.
With the rapid influx of migrant workers to meet the labor demand, the kafala system
emerged as the regulatory mechanism for the migrant labor population. The kafala system, best
described as a sponsorship system, has played a central role in the rapid economic development
in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait,
and the United Arab Emirates. Though it has allowed the Gulf States to obtain the resources
necessary to develop both economically and cosmetically, the system has had an array of
undesirable byproducts that have significantly altered the texture of Gulf society. The kafala
system, which exists outside of the legal framework of GCC states, allows countries to abuse
the rights of migrant workers. This paper seeks to articulate theses injustices and explain how
the kafala system has allowed Gulf countries to perpetuate these rights abuses. Further, this
paper will discuss how the effects of the kafala system have manifested themselves in the
present day, where the continued abuse of migrant workers in the Gulf has resulted in multitiered and structurally insolated societies. The case study of Dubai discusses how the kafala
system unfolds in one of the most iconic cities in the world and seeks to articulate the lived
experiences that are often omitted from modernization narratives.

2 History
The history of the GCC countries, especially in terms of migration flows, is popularly
divided into periods of pre-oil and post-oil. However, the Arabian Gulf hosts a long history of
global connectivity and interaction with its neighboring countries. The oil boom in the 1950s
and 60s in the Arabian Gulfs parked rapid development, which put a demand on labor.1 Due to
small population sizes in the Gulf, GCC countries relied on imported labor to balance out their
local labor deficits, which has primarily been sourced from the Indian subcontinent and South
Asia.2
Long before the discovery of oil and the arrival of the British and Portuguese in the
16th century, the dominant industry in the Gulf was pearl diving, which fostered a flourishing
trade market between the Arabian Gulf and its Persian and Asian neighbors. Gulf locals took
advantage of the rich pearl beds situated in the Indian Ocean, and their livelihoods were formed
around the trade of this amenity. The Indian and Iranian merchants, who were wealthier than
their Gulf neighbors at the time, profited from trading pearls and returning home with high
quality goods to sell (Vora 2013, 54). They also participated in trading textiles, rice, and other
foods and spices (Gardner 2010, 26).
Because the Gulf was not as wealthy or developed as its neighbors, powerful members
of South Asian families profited from setting up banks in the region, serving as financiers to
ruling families and oftentimes loaned money to the pearl divers and ship owners. This dynamic
allowed the merchants to profit from interest rates at the expense of the divers who were actually
taking part in the manual labor (Gardner 2010, 26).
The pearl industry and the presence of Indian and Persian merchants established
trade ties between the Gulf and its neighbors on the opposite side of the Indian Ocean
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long before the arrival of the Portuguese and the British. When the British arrived in the
Gulf and established its protectorate of several skeikhdoms along the coast in 1820, the
pre-established trade ties between the Gulf and its regional neighbors were formalized.3
This shift was reflected in the emerging Indian population in Gulf port cities, and dependence
on India and South Asia as trade partners intensified. Further trade activity was to be limited
to British colonial goods, which resulted in a deepened connection between the Gulf and India
(Vora 2013, 54).

2.1 Waves of Immigration to the Gulf
Because of the long-standing presence of Indians and Persians in the Gulf, flows of
migration to and from the Gulf have continued for much of known history. Andrew Gardner
divides these flows into three overlapping waves. The first wave dates back to the beginning
of known history in the Gulf and ends with the arrival of the British. For much of known
history, Indian merchants travelled across the Indian Ocean to participate in trade of rice, cloth,
food and spices (Gardner 2010, 26). These merchants often returned back to the subcontinent,
though some remained and established themselves as bankers and financiers. This phase set the
framework for future trade and migration conduits.
The second wave began with the presence of the British in the Gulf, dating back to 1820.
The establishment of British protectorates, known as Trucial States, formalized the connection
to the Indian subcontinent. Because of the proximity and established British presence in
India, Britain’s relations with the Gulf were largely conducted by British Indian officials. The
presence of British administrators in the Gulf fostered the migration of Indian bureaucrats
during this period (Gardner 2010, 27). During this period the Gulf also began to form the basic
infrastructure of a modern government, which included the establishment of governmental
departments and institutions.
The third and final wave is characterized by the booming oil industry in the Gulf. This
phase began in the 1960s and gathered speed in the 1970s. Though oil was discovered in the
early part of the 20th century in the Gulf, the widespread success of the oil industry was not seen
until the 1960s and 70s (Gardner 2010, 27). The new and rapid influx of wealth in these recently
independent countries inspired plans for development and modernization, which necessitated
the importation of labor.
During this period, many of the Gulf States gained independence from Britain. The
British government realized that it could not afford to continue its protectorate of the Trucial
States. The British government announced this decision in 1968, and by 1971 the Treaty that
established the Trucial States had ended. Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi and Sheikh Rashid of
Dubai met after the announcement in 1968 to discuss a federation of the Trucial States. Bahrain
and Qatar denied the invitation to join the federation and formed their own separate countries.
When the protectorate of Trucial States officially expired on December 1, 1971, Abu Dhabi and
Dubai formed a union along with the leaders of five other sheikhdoms (Gornall 2011). Today,
these make up the seven emirates of the United Arab Emirates.
The demographic profile of the typical migrant also shifted during this third wave. Until
the late 1980s and 1990s, the majority of migrants came from other Arab countries, such as
Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq (Babar 2014). This time period saw a sharp decrease in
the numbers of Arab migrants and a substantial increase in Asian migrants, a shift that is often
referred to as the “Asianization” of migrant labor (Kamrava and Babar 2012).
Gulf countries were initially very tolerant of Arab migrants due to their cultural and
linguistic homogeneity. Though the cultural similarities between locals and Arab migrant
populations once appealed to Gulf governments, the booming oil industry forced leaders
to reevaluate the presence of other Arabs in the Gulf. At the time, Pan-Arabism ideologies
successfully blanketed the rest of the Middle East. The Pan-Arabism ideology viewed Arab
countries as a single nation and supported the unification of all countries in the Arab world.
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This integration of the Gulf with the rest of the Arab world would entail the redistribution of
oil wealth among the Arab community. These thoughts and ideas were viewed as progressive
and revolutionary, and leaders in the Gulf began to view this movement as a threat to the stable,
authoritarian monarchies (Babar 2014).
The booming oil industry allowed Gulf States to develop extensive welfare programs
which provided generous benefits for its citizens. With the rise of the welfare state, Gulf
countries became more limited in their scope of tolerance. While Gulf countries once offered
naturalization programs for other Arab migrants, these programs were phased out by the 1970s
(Babar 2014). Other nationality and citizenship laws were instituted, making welfare benefits
exclusive to Gulf nationals. Gulf leaders began to view Asian migrants as less of a threat than
Arabs, and their position as laborers in the region became preferred for many reasons. Kamrava
and Babar explain that Asians are less of an ideological threat than their Arab neighbors, Asians
tolerate lower wages, they are easier to lay off, easier to segregate, and they tend to migrate
without their families (Kamrava and Babar 2012, 8). By the end of the 20th century, South
Asians became the face of migrants in GCC countries.

2.2 Post Oil
While the narrative of migration in GCC countries oftentimes perceives oil as the
determinant for migration flows, the longstanding history of the Indian and Persian presence in
the Gulf demonstrates otherwise. However, the oil industry did serve as a catalyst for inflows
of immigrants, particularly those working in the construction and labor industries.
Before the discovery of oil, Gulf cities were centered around regional trading ports and
mercantile centers. The rapid success that oil brought to the region allowed countries such as the
United Arab Emirates to devote oil revenues to development and modernization plans, which
aimed to construct a global and cosmopolitan landscape. Somewhere between the mercantile
history and the new cosmopolitan prototype of Gulf countries, Asian migrants became socially
and physically marginalized on the periphery of the successes of these new, iconic cities. In
the case study of Dubai, I will discuss the shift from the city-center in the Dubai Creek area of
Dubai’s mercantile days to the “New Dubai” in the post-oil landscape and how this move left
migrant workers behind.

3 Trends and Statistics
All six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates - are characterized by a demographic imbalance
between migrants and nationals. All six countries are included in the top 20 nations in the
world with the highest proportion of migrants to nationals (Kamrava and Babar 2012, 8). The
United Arab Emirates is the quintessential example of this rapid increase in the sheer number of
migrant workers in a short period of time (See Figure 1). From 2007 to 2008, there was a jump
from 3.11 million migrant workers to 4.07, a 30% increase over the time period of one year
(Janardhan 2011, 97). In Qatar, the economically active population doubled three times from
2004 to 2011 (State of Qatar 2011). By 2011, non-Qataris reached 93.9% of the total population
(State of Qatar 2011).
This dynamic places a myriad of pressures on local populations, local governments and
on the migrants themselves. Not only has this increase in immigration had a drastic effect on
the population demographics, but also on the workforce. It is estimated that by 2020, Emirati
nationals will account for less than 4% of the total workforce in their own country (Janardhan
2011, 98). The Gulf countries have historically had small native-born populations, so extensive
development and modernization plans in GCC countries required an influx of labor to put
the blueprints of these elaborate projects to life. The construction industry is one of the most
essential to these projects, so I will focus on this particular industry throughout this paper.
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Figure 1 Source: UAE National Bureau of Statistics; Graph generated by author

This rapid growth of the migrant population has marginalized nationals in terms of jobs
and employment in the private sector. Because Asian immigrants are willing to work for lower
wages and are easier to manage, construction companies and service sector employers prefer
non-nationals. Another byproduct of oil revenue is the welfare state, in which governments
provide extensive benefits to its citizens. As part of these benefits, the government reserves
public sector jobs for citizen workers. For example, non-nationals make up almost 85% of
the total population in the United Arab Emirates (Central Intelligence Agency 2013). Of the
employed non-nationals in the country, 64.6% are working for the private sector compared with
7.4% of employed nationals (United Arab Emirates Government 2009, Table 18). 4
This dynamic is very apparent in Gulf cities. The segregation of nationalities between
sectors of the economy was visible within the first few hours I spend in the UAE. The Dubai
International Airport, owned by the Dubai government, is fully employed by Emirati nationals,
which is indicated by the traditional Emirati garb. However once you leave the airport and get
in a cab or enter a mall, it appears that the private sector is dominated by South Asian migrant
populations. When dealing with the Immigration Office or other divisions of the government, it
was apparent that all employees were Emirati nationals.

3.1 Remittances
As hosts to a large number of foreign workers, GCC countries have become significant
contributors to global net remittance totals. According to a calculation by N. Janardhan,
remittances from GCC countries total $35 billion each year (Janardhan 2011, 121). The
top remittance recipient in 2010 was India, who received $55 billion (World Bank 2011).
The Philippines, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Egypt were also in the top 10 recipients (World
Bank 2011). Not surprisingly, these are the countries that constitute a majority of the migrant
population in Gulf countries.
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman were in the top 10 remittance-sending countries
in 2009 (World Bank 2011). The United Arab Emirates and Qatar do not have any data on
remittances. The charts in Figure 2 illustrate the sheer quantities of money that GCC countries
are contributing to the global economy through remittances.
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Figure 2 -- Source: World Bank; charts generated by author

3.2 Emigration
Of the 232 million migrants in the world in 2013, more than half were concentrated
in just 10 countries. Of these ten countries, the United Arab Emirates hosted 8 million and
Saudi Arabia hosted 9 million (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2013). India
consistently tops the list of the immigration source countries in the GCC, and South Asians
make up the majority of the population in the United Arab Emirates (Janardhan 2011, 96). In
2013, 2.9 million Indians were residing in the UAE. India to the UAE was the second most
populated corridor of migration in 2013.5
These numbers do not indicate motivations of migration, whether they be political or
economic, however they are telling of the broad trends that the Gulf has witnessed. Though
South Asian labor migrants dominate the migrant population in Gulf countries, the migrant
population is still very diverse. While the numbers do not constitute a significant amount of
the total population, there are many East African and European expatriates living in the Gulf
(Central Intelligence Agency 2013).6

4 Treatment of Workers
The rapid influx of migrant workers to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries
has provided the necessary manpower for the light speed execution of development plans in
the Gulf. Gulf cities have become known for their luxurious offerings, exhibited best by the
United Arab Emirates. From the tallest building in the world, to the artificial palm islands, to
the fastest roller coaster in the world in Abu Dhabi’s Ferrari World, the United Arab Emirates
has consistently topped lists and broken records in the last few decades. Like all good things,
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this luxury and extravagance comes with a price. The development of Gulf cities has come at
the expense of the rights and liberties of the migrant labor population, whose lived experiences
are often overshadowed by the successes of their labor.
With the shift of Gulf cities to new, more cosmopolitan areas in the early part of the
21st century, the demographic imbalance became polarized at the expense migrant workers. As
the wealthy urbanized and moved to newer areas of the city, populations that could not keep
up remained on the periphery of the city. This divide was not only physical, but as Gulf cities
became more developed and modern, boundaries between nationals and non-nationals became
more defined both socially and institutionally.7
This shift essentially deteriorated the quality of life for migrant workers, who built
these new cities with their own hands and were then forced to live on their peripheries. Hiring
foreign workers in low status sectors of the economy allows countries to fill the low rungs of
society with foreigners without creating sharp class divides within their own local population
(Weiner 1990, 3). Because the GCC countries were newly independent, there were often few
mechanisms to ensure protection for laborers. Migrant workers are mistreated throughout every
stage of the immigration process, by the recruiting agencies in their home countries, the GCC
governments themselves, and by their employers. The reality of the lives of migrant laborers
are not simply characterized by harsh working conditions, but injustices that deny this portion
of the population basic human rights. The rest of this section is dedicated to discussing these
injustices and discriminations and how they create a cycle of debt and misery for the South
Asian demographic in the GCC.

4.1 Recruitment
The beginning stages of the migration process are in the sending country. Agencies recruit
workers in the home country and arrange a contract between the worker and the employer in the
destination country. This is perceived as an invaluable service to the migrant, who often has a
vision of foreseeable success for their new lives in the destination country. This idealized vision
allows recruitment agents to charge inflated prices for their services, averaging between 2,000
and 3,000 US Dollars (Human Rights Watch 2006, 8).
The recruiters arrange employment contracts, apply for worker visas in the destination
country, and purchase air travel. If a migrant is not able to pay the recruitment fees him or
herself or with the help of friends and family, he or she can take a loan with staggering interest
rates from the recruitment agency (Human Rights Watch 2006, 8).
The combination of recruitment fees and interest rates tacked onto the loans to pay the
fees puts migrants in a disadvantaged state of debt before they even arrive to their destination
country. To add to the financial stress, agents and brokers in sending countries often have
meager information about the contracts which they arrange (Gardner 2012, 57). Employers
often switch the terms of contract upon arrival to the destination country, which include much
lower wages and poorer living conditions than they were promised by the agent in their home
country (Human Rights Watch 2006, 34). This transaction of misinformation perpetuates what
Gardner calls the “migration industry,” where agents and employers “profit from the migration
flows, using poor information to extract profit from the flow of unskilled migrants to the region,”
(Gardner 2012, 57). The recruiters create and exploit this idealized vision of life in the Gulf to
make a profit.
Once the migrant arrives in the destination country and begins work, the shock of reality
of life in the Gulf as a migrant worker begins to set in. It usually takes about two years for
workers to pay back debts to their recruitment agencies and to their friends and family (Human
Rights Watch 2006, 8). Gardner states that at this point, romanticized visions of life in the Gulf
that were formed in the sending countries have likely been contradicted by the reality of lived
experiences. The migrants themselves also contribute to this transaction of misinformation.
When they realize that their initial views of life in the Gulf were rooted in fantasy, feelings
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of embarrassment set in. The migrants and their families made great sacrifices to send them
to the Gulf, so the migrants do not want their families to be disappointed or worried that their
living conditions in their new homes are abysmal. The combination of pride and desire to
prevent their families from feeling worried results in migrants depicting idealized images of
their lives in the Gulf that contradict with reality. Andrew Gardner noted that many of the
migrants he interviewed sent pictures of themselves sitting behind a desk back to their families,
which further perpetuates the issue of misinformation in sending countries about life in the Gulf
(Gardner 2012, 58).

4.2 Passport Confiscation and Travel Bans
One of the most common and consistent injustices cited by migrant workers is the
confiscation of passports upon arrival in the destination country. Though the practice is illegal
in most GCC countries, passports are widely and systematically confiscated by companies and
employers. Of the 60 construction workers interviewed in the UAE for Human Rights Watch’s
“Building towers, Cheating Workers,” none reported that they were allowed to maintain
possession of their own passports (Human Rights Watch 2006, 10).
The practice of confiscating passports effectively places a travel ban on migrant
workers. This procedure is justified by companies so that workers do not abscond and break
their contracts. Confiscating passports creates a power structure between the employee and the
employer, with the employer holding virtually all of the power. This dynamic allows companies
to treat workers unjustly and makes it nearly impossible for workers to break free of their harsh
living and working conditions.
Passports are also often held as collateral to prevent workers making any legal claims
against their sponsor or employer (Gardner 2010, 62-3). This provides yet another conduit for
companies to profit from the injustice done to migrant workers. If a worker wishes to break
away from his contract, the only way of doing so is to buy back his passport from his employer
and return home. Because the worker is already in debt as a result of the recruitment fees,
paying more money to leave without paying off preexisting debt is unlikely. The workers are
therefore beholden to their sponsor.

4.3 Wages
Another aspect of life as a migrant worker in the Gulf that contributes to the devaluation
of romanticized views fashioned in the home country is the insufficient wages that the workers
receive as compensation for their intensive labor. On average, a construction worker in the
United Arab Emirates makes a mere $175 per month (Human Rights Watch 2006, 23).
Not only are the wages consistently low for the service sector in GCC countries, but
there is also a wage disparity based on nationality and ethnicity. Inconsistent values are placed
on the work done by certain nationalities, placing South and East Asians on the bottom rung
of the ladder. The work of Arab migrants and Western expatriates are valued much higher than
Asian migrants, but still Emirati nationals are placed at the top of the ladder, earning much
higher wages for less work.
This phenomenon is supported by numbers found in the Labor Force Survey conducted
by the Dubai government. The mean income per month for an Emirati national is 20,557.50
AED (5,597.69 USD), with the median at 18,000 AED (4,901.29 USD). For non-nationals, the
mean income for month is 5,813.08 AED (1,582.87 USD), and a median of 2,500 AED (680.74
USD) (United Arab Emirates Government 2009, Table 36).8
An examination of wages in the public and private sector offers another piece of
supporting evidence of the wage disparity in GCC countries. In a closer look at the wages of
all residents (including nationals and non-nationals) in the United Arab Emirates that breaks
down economic activity by sector, it is found that almost one-third of construction workers
makes less than 1,300 AED ($353.98) per month. 23.8% make between 1,300 and 2,999 AED
per month ($353.98 - $816.61), and 24.5% make between 3,000 and 7,999 AED per month
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($816.88 - $2,178.08) (United Arab Emirates Government 2009, Table 33).9 A vast majority of
the construction sector does not even earn half the median earned by nationals.
On the other hand, the majority of public administration officials make over
18,000 AED ($4,901.29) per month. 25.4% make between 8,000 and 17,999 AED
per month ($2,178.35 - $4,901) (United Arab Emirates Government 2009, Table 33).
Also in the public sector, almost half of legislators, senior officials and managers in the United
Arab Emirates make above 18,000 AED per month ($4,901.29). 37% make between 8,000 and
17,999 ($2,178.35 – $4,901) (United Arab Emirates Government 2009, Table 32). This same
ethno-national hierarchical structure that exists in the Emirates is present across Gulf countries.
In a study on labor in Kuwait in 2009, Dinkha and Dakhli found that Kuwaiti nationals earn
higher pay for the same jobs (Dinkha and Dakhli 2009, 52).
The wage discrepancies between migrant workers, nationals and Western expats creates a
social hierarchy that places migrant laborers in the lowest bracket of society. The legal structure
in place, of which the kafala system is a part, creates a system of favoritism, which benefits
nationals in all areas of life, including business ownership, education, work, welfare benefits
and various other rights (Dinkha and Dakhli 2009, 51). The random valuation of labor based
on nationality creates what Dinkha and Dakhli call a “multi-tier labor market,” which applies
different laws, wages, and benefits to each socially insulated tier (Dinkha and Dakhli 2009, 48).
The tension between nationals and the lowest rungs of society, which are dominated by
migrant populations, is ever-present in the Gulf, and treating migrant workers like they don’t
exist is a socially engrained practice that is taught at an early age. It is so deep-seated that even
tourists catch on to the systematic erasure of the labor force of the Gulf. Upon arrival to the
United Arab Emirates, one of the first things that I was told was never to make eye contact with
a laborer on the street. Inter-class dialogue is seen as socially unacceptable, and this dynamic of
separation end exclusion has instilled a culture of racism and classism in the Gulf. Disparities
among the expatriate population are also present. For instance, Western expatriates do not
receive the benefits of citizenship, but they have more social mobility and access to white-collar
industries. On the other hand, it is extremely rare to find expatriates of Asian or African descent
working a white-collar job. This portion of the migrant population dominates the service sector
of the economy.

4.3.1 Withheld Wages
In addition to inadequate wages, another one of the most common complaints
among migrant workers is withheld wages (Human Rights Watch 2006, 29). The monetary
compensation for the strenuous labor is already inadequate, but companies and employers
systematically withhold wages from workers for months at a time. According to labor laws
in the UAE, withholding wages from workers is deemed illegal.10 However, like many other
regulations in the country, this law is commonly ignored.
Withheld wages has been the leading cause of strikes in the UAE and across the Gulf
(Human Rights Watch 2006, 30).11 Though unionizing and striking is deemed illegal throughout
the country and punished by deportation, the consequences associated with withheld wages are
grave enough to drive workers to risk deportation. When wages are withheld, workers are forced
to borrow money with interest just to obtain the resources needed to survive. Withholding
wages is comparable to confiscating passports as a mechanism utilized by countries to prevent
workers from absconding. A worker is less likely to quit and return home if that means sacrificing
months of pay, especially if they are already in debt to the recruitment agencies back at home.

4.4 Labor Camps
One of the most shocking and heartbreaking aspects of the reality of the lives of
migrant workers in the Gulf are their living conditions. Workers are piled into labor camps on
the periphery of the city, which are segregated from the city center both geographically and
socially. Their distance from the city and from the eyes of nationals allows the companies and
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government to overlook the unsanitary and ghastly living conditions of migrant workers.
In Dubai’s two largest camps, Al Quoz and Sonapor, the typical dwelling is a small room
of 12 by 9 feet which sleeps as many as 8 workers (Human Rights Watch 2009, 23). Other
accounts of labor camps cite as many as 12 workers sharing one room (Ali 2010, 91). Not only
are these camps overcrowded, but they lack sanitary living conditions. In Sayed Ali’s account
of Sonapur, he disclosed that many of the compounds have poor drainage and sanitation. Septic
tanks have overflown, leaving pools of stagnant sewage throughout the compound. This is to
no fault of the workers, but rather the camp owners who consciously choose not to operate the
camp in a proper manner (Ali 2010, 91). In another camp that Human Rights Watch visited,
electricity was cut off because the company chose not to pay the bills (Human Rights Watch
2006, 34).
In April 2009, BBC’s Panorama program exposed that the UAE’s largest construction
firm, Arabtec, housed their employees in filthy and overcrowded camps. Raw sewage laid in
stagnant pools throughout the camp, requiring workers to tip toe on stepping stones just to
navigate in their living space. Many of the toilets lacked water, resulting in massive piles of raw
feces (Allen 2009). This exposé was one of the first of its kind, revealing the inhumane living
conditions in which migrant workers are housed.
GCC governments lack the mechanisms to prevent these sorts of injustices done unto
migrant workers. In the case of the Arabtec situation, the government fined the company 10,000
AED ($2,723) in the aftermath of BBC’s expose. However, this is a small sum for such a large
company. This suggests that the governments do not see any responsibility for the behavior of
corporations working in their territory, and a later section will demonstrate how governments
use free trade zones to allow foreign companies to operate outside of the legal framework.
The government also tacitly promotes this marginalization of migrant workers through
legal codes. Even if companies or employers desired to house their employees in the heart
of the city with acceptable living conditions, the government makes it difficult to do so. In
2006, the Dubai government cracked down on bachelors living in villas in family designated
neighborhoods (Ali 2010, 93). Because single men are legally forbidden from family residential
areas, migrant workers particularly in the construction sector, which is dominated by males, are
systematically excluded from these neighborhoods. Coincidentally, these are the neighborhoods
that occupy the center of the city. When a construction firm in Dubai headed by a European family
decided to house its employees in villas in the Jumeirah area, officials from the municipality
evicted the workers and encouraged them to find housing in a labor camp (Ali 2010, 93).12
It is important to note that the frequency of laborers forced to live in camps is high. A
survey conducted by the Qatar government in 2008 showed that of all the housing in Qatar,
¼ of the housing units were dedicated to worker housing compounds, and about 60% of the
population of Qatar lived in these compounds. Of those that live in worker compounds, ¾ of
these residents are male expatriates (Permanent Population Committee of the State of Qatar
2009).
As GCC countries modernized, developed, and globalized, the center of the city shifted
from older port areas to new, globalized city centers. This shift also raised the cost of living
in both areas. From 2005 to 2006 in Dubai, rents drastically increased in price. In some areas,
rent increased over 100 percent and continued to increase into 2008 (Ali 2010, 93). As GCC
countries and cities globalized, migrant workers were left behind and were unable to keep up
with new lavish lifestyles that global GCC cities promoted. The shift from regional mercantile
trading centers to global oil producers effectively marginalized the labor force of Gulf countries.
The location of labor camps on the outskirts of Gulf cities allows nationals and other
Western expatriates to remain ignorant to the lives of migrant workers. The map below of
the major labor camps in Dubai provides a telling illustration of their sidelined position in
the city. This contributes to the inherent classism of Gulf societies, and instills a state of
silence in Gulf residents when it comes to the lives and living conditions of migrant workers.
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4.5 Ban on Labor Unions, Strikes, and Organization
Another mechanism that GCC governments utilize to subordinate migrant workers is
through prohibiting laborers from joining labor unions, organizing, and striking. The voices of
migrant workers are practically nonexistent in legal narratives. As Human Rights Watch points
out, there are no organizations independent of the government to advocate for migrant workers’
rights. There is also no mechanism to systematically report abuses of workers (Human Rights
Watch 2006, 24).
Though the kafala system forbids strikes among laborers, they have been quite common
among construction workers across the Gulf. From May to December of 2005, over 800
workers united in one of the UAE’s biggest protests. Workers effectively blocked Dubai’s
main thoroughfare to protest the systematic practice of withholding wages. The strikers cited
four consecutive months of withheld wages by Al Hamed Development and Construction
Country. The Minister of Labor quickly demanded that the company pay the delayed wages,
and his timely response was promulgated as a sign that the government is dedicated to holding
companies accountable for the treatment of their workers (Human Rights Watch 2006, 31).
However, the government fell short of actually ensuring that the company pay the workers their
wages in the aftermath of the scandal. One Pakistani employee of the company told HRW that
Al Hamed only paid two of the four months of withheld wages. Further, the leaders of the strike
were dismissed from the company and deported back to their home countries (Human Rights
Watch 2006, 31).
During the construction of the Burj Khalifa, the tallest building in the world, the
tension between workers and their companies was extreme.13 Because of the global nature of
the construction of the Burj Khalifa and its symbolic precedence throughout the world, the
construction process was watched with much more scrutiny than ever before. By March of
2006, the tensions were so high between the workers and their employers that 2,500 migrants
banded together to protest their working conditions. They were unsatisfied with their low wages,
living conditions, and delayed payments (Janardhan 2011, 109). The protests turned violent,
and the government responded with a new rule that any expatriates who provoked riots would
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be deported and unable to return to work for a year (Janardhan 2011, 109).
The kafala system’s ban on labor unions and strikes among migrant labors allows Gulf
governments to treat the workers as temporary guests who are privileged to be working in
the Gulf. This sets a tone for the workers that they must watch their every move, and even
something as simple as demanding the pay that they are owed can earn them a ticket back to
their home country.

4.6 Health
Not only do the unsanitary living conditions discussed above pose health problems
for migrant workers, but workers in many sectors are also subjected to hazardous working
conditions each day. The construction industry is a perfect example of the hazardous working
conditions that workers face.
The construction industry experiences high injury and death rates in the Gulf. In the
Emirates, labor laws require employers to protect against the hazards of injuries and disease,
provide emergency health care for their workers, pay for the medical treatment of injured
workers, and to report injuries to the Ministry of Labor (Human Rights Watch 2006, 48). This
same law regulates the maximum number of working hours, requires annual leave and overtime,
and delineates terms of recruitment. The law also requires the government to set a minimum
wage, however this portion of the law was never executed.
While administrators in the Ministry of Labor in the UAE are to supposed ensure that
employers are in compliance with safety and health regulations, companies can generally
evade complying with these regulations since the Ministry has been largely ineffective in
their oversight. The Ministry only employs 140 inspectors to oversee 240,000 businesses
and companies (Human Rights Watch 2006, 44). This is a glaring disproportionality, which
indicates that the government is not truly dedicated to ensuring the health and safety of migrant
workers, who are usually employed by the private companies which the Ministry of Labor is
supposed to oversee.
Numbers and statistics prove just how hazardous the working conditions in the Gulf
are for construction workers. In the UAE, there are more than 700 deaths and 90 suicides each
year (Ali 2010, 83). Though there are no official government figures on work related injuries
due to a lack of systematic reporting by companies, a number can still be synthesized through
independent investigation and local trade publications. Construction Week, an online publication
for construction news in the Middle East, reported that in 2004 alone, 880 migrant construction
workers died, 460 of which were Indian, 375 Pakistani, and 45 Bangladeshi (Human Rights
watch 2006, 11). Another means of determining the number of work related deaths is through
consulates. The Indian Consulate in Dubai reported 971 deaths in 2005, 61 of which were onsite accidents (Human Rights Watch 2006, 11).
Extremely long work days, few days off, and the heat are a few of the conditions which
contribute to hazardous work environments.

4.6.1 Hours and Rest Days
Construction workers in GCC states and other laborers in the service sector are forced
to work long days, lasting up to 12 hours each day, with only one day of rest each week.
The Dubai Labor Force survey shows the disparity of working hours between nationals and
migrant workers. In every sector surveyed, non-nationals worked more total hours per week
than nationals (United Arab Emirates Government 2009, Table 28). 4.1% of nationals worked
more than 60 hours each week, while 30.4% of non-nationals worked more than 60 hours each
week (UAE Government 2009, Table 23). In the construction sector alone, 22.1% work more
than 60 hours a week, while only 4% of those working in public administration and defense
and 10.5% of federal and local government employees average over 60 hours each week (UAE
Government 2009, Table 25 and 26). When looking at average hours per week, non-national
construction workers average 51.8 hours while nationals in the public administration average
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40 hours a week (UAE Government 2009, Table 29).
Not only are the working hours much higher for non-nationals, especially in the
construction sector, but the Labor Force Survey also indicated that employees of the sectors
that average more hours make less money. In a distribution of paid employees who worked
more than 48 hours per week by level of monthly wages, 64.7% of service workers make less
than 1,300 AED each month ($354). On the other hand, 41% of legislators and senior officials
who work more than 48 hours a week make between 8,000 and 17,999 AED per month ($2,178
- $4,901) (UAE Government 2009, Table 41).

4.6.2 Heat
During the summer months, the Gulf countries reach up to 50 degrees Celsius (122
degrees Fahrenheit). According to the Dubai Chapter of the World Safety Organization, heatrelated illness is the most important issue facing construction workers (Human Rights Watch
2006, 41). Extreme heat can cause strokes and dehydration among other health concerns. Rashid
Hospital in Dubai reported that as many as 5,000 construction workers were brought into the
emergency room for heat-related incidents during July and August of 2004 (Human Rights
Watch 2006, 41).
In 2005, the UAE government instituted a ban on outdoor construction during the hottest
hours of the day to address the health concern that the heat poses (Ali 2010, 83). However,
because there are few inspectors to ensure that companies and employers are in compliance
with heath regulations, the companies rarely abide by this regulation. Regardless, allowing
workers to work during the peak heat hours is punishable by a fine that equates to pocket change
for large companies.

5 Legality
The GCC has created a paradox of crafting ultramodern, luxurious cities for locals and
Westerners to enjoy while denying these same luxuries to the migrant population that makes it
all possible. GCC governments have created a legal system that systematically denies rights to
migrant workers while promoting extensive and lucrative benefits for nationals. On the surface,
this allows Gulf countries to appear as modern, cosmopolitan, and developed. However, you
don’t need to spend much time in the Gulf to find that the treatment of migrant workers starkly
contrasts with the modern and stately infrastructure. This section aims to explain how GCC
countries legally perpetuate the denial of rights and harsh abuses of migrant laborers.

5.1 Kafala System
GCC countries employ a system known as kafala that allows the government to monitor
migrant laborers through national sponsors. The system ties each laborer to a kafeel (sponsor)
in the destination country, who is responsible for arranging his or her visa and employment
contract. The kafeel, or sponsor, is usually also the migrant’s employer. The system requires all
labor migrants to operate through contracts, which usually last for two to three years at a time.
Through locating the responsibility of migrants at the level of the sponsor, the state evades any
sort of legal accountability for the migrant labor population. This controversial system allows
Gulf governments to avoid recognizing migrant workers as residents, meaning that they are not
obliged to uphold their rights or to administer benefits in the way that they do for nationals.
This system situates migrant workers as temporary, or “guest” workers of Gulf countries, which
creates an environment of temporality and impermanence for the laborers. The kafala system
dictates the lives of many workers in Gulf countries. In the United Arab Emirates, about 90% of
the population is on a temporary visa (Ali 2010).
Gulf governments choose to uphold the kafala system because it is an easy method of
ignoring and profiting from the human rights abuses of migrant workers. By using the language
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of “guest” or “temporary” workers, GCC governments have created a legal system that excludes
migrant workers from society (Vora 2013). The kafala system is an outgrowth of a cultural
practice that was used to organize labor on pearling dhow boats, so the system is viewed as a
cultural legacy in the Gulf. The system emerged as it is practiced today in the 20th century, but
is only partially coded in the law (Gardner 2010, 59).
The kafala system requires migrant laborers to have a sponsor in the destination
country, which effectively ties the migrant to the sponsor for the duration of his or
her stay. This structure makes it hard for workers to abscond from their contracts,
which usually last for about two to three years. The system also requires nationals
to comprise a majority of ownership for all companies in the country (Ali 2010, 27).
Because at least 51 percent of the company must be owned by nationals, large numbers of
nationals are profiting as business partners in exchange for carrying little weight. For instance,
if a business startup plan was only lacking a national owner, the creators of the business will
find a national to sign the paper saying he or she owns a portion of the business. The national
does not have to put up any capital of his or her own but still profits from the business venture
(Ali 2010, 27).14
This system produces a wide range of negative consequences for migrant workers while
at the same time benefits the sponsors, companies, and GCC countries. Governments prefer
to exclude the migrant labor population from the legal framework of the country because
when their voices are not engaged in legal affairs, they pose less of a threat to the political and
economic structures present in the country (Ali 2010, 27). When migrants have no voice in the
legal system, their grievances are not taken into account in policy, laws, and other government
operations.
Governments also benefit because labor management is left to the companies instead of
to the state (Kamrava and Babar 2012, 11). This limits the role of the government in protecting
workers’ rights, and allows the state to point fingers to the hiring companies when they find
themselves under a microscope for allowing human rights abuses. The migrant is connected to
his or her kafeel, not to the state, allowing the state to articulate itself as a minimal player as the
guarantor of rights.

5.2 Oversight Deficiency
Through allowing GCC governments to control migrant populations through sponsor
proxies, the kafala system provides a mechanism for states to exclude migrant laborers from
many different spheres of society. In addition to locating the responsibility of migrant laborers
at the level of the employer instead of in the state, the government systematically ignores its
own laws aiming to protect migrant workers through a lack of oversight. Though there are in
fact laws in place to protect migrants from labor abuses, Gulf governments oftentimes fail to
provide the necessary mechanisms for enforcing these laws.
In the case of the United Arab Emirates, laws are in place to protect workers from
abuse beginning with the recruitment process in their home countries. There are laws banning
recruitment agencies and local employers from charging the migrants any fees associated with
the recruitment process (Human Rights Watch 2006, 11). Employers or sponsors in the UAE
are required to pay a fee for each worker they recruit into the country, which is used to pay for
things such as the employment visa. Though the employer is legally required to cover this cost,
these fees are usually levied onto the migrant during the recruitment process (Human Rights
Watch 2006, 26). UAE Labor Law no. 8 of 1980, which applies to both nationals and migrants,
regulates maximum working hours, provides for annual leave an overtime, regulates terms of
recruitment, and requires employers to protect against the hazards of work-related injury and
disease (Human Rights Watch 2006, 48). Employers are required to report work-related injuries
to the Ministry of Labor, and they are also required to pay for the medical treatment for injured
workers (Human Rights Watch 2006, 49).
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Though there are established penalties for violations of the law, deficiency in
governmental oversight has allowed companies to abuse migrant laborers against the will of the
law. The Ministry of Labor only employs 140 inspectors to oversee the practice of over 240,000
businesses and companies, which serves as a tacit promotion of the violation of these labor laws
at the expense of the migrants (Human Rights Watch 2006, 44).
Even if there was an effective mechanism in place to ensure the compliance of the labor
laws, the penalties are negligible. The penalty for a violation of any part of UAE’s Labor Law
No. 8 includes imprisonment not to exceed 6 months, and a fine between 3,000 AED and 10,000
AED ($833-2,778) (Human Rights Watch 2006, 27). These fees are a small chunk of change
compared to the exorbitant profit earned by large companies in Gulf countries.
GCC governments have done little to prevent the abuse of migrant workers. If anything,
their efforts can be considered reactionary. Governments prefer what David Mendicoff calls
“ad hoc accommodations” that promote informal regulation of abuses (Mendicoff 2012, 194).
Using ad hoc measures allows GCC states to uphold their neoliberal policies, which promote
a free market, while avoiding the obligation to implement regulatory mechanisms. This
perpetuates the status of the migrant population as “temporary” instead of an integral part of
their communities. Regulatory, legal enforcement would undermine the dynamic of temporality
that the kafala system instills (Mendicoff 2012, 2014).

5.3 International Law
Though the role of international law holds less authority than domestic law, it is still
important to address the potential role that international law may serve in standardizing the
treatment of migrant workers across the board. While international legal norms have no authority
to prevent abuses on the domestic level, they are an important means of urging countries to
adopt and uphold policies to protect the rights of migrants.
A number of international conventions and declarations set forth the rights of all
human beings, regardless of state ratification. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic and Social Rights define the rights of all persons to be the right to life, liberty and
security; the right not to be held in slavery or servitude; not to be subjected to torture, cruelty,
or inhumane treatment; the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile; the
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state; and the right to work, free
choice of employment and just working conditions (Martin 2012, 218-9).
The United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
their Families reestablishes these basic human rights previously set forth, but now in a context
specific to migrant workers (Martin 2012, 219). The Convention aims to protect workers from
torture, inhuman treatment and punishment, forced or compulsory labor, attacks on honor or
reputation, unhealthy working conditions, unequal treatment between migrants and nationals,
among others (Martin 2012, 220). The GCC states are clearly in violation of many components
of this Convention. However, the Convention is only ratified by a little more than 40 states,
which doesn’t include any of the six GCC countries.
Though it appears that governments are willing to talk about international migration, it
is apparent that there are no genuine efforts to improve migration policy. Susan Martin suggests
that the most effective way of altering migration policy on the international level would be
through coordination between destination and sending countries (Martin 2012, 221). If the
effort becomes bilateral, workers’ rights have the greatest chance of protection.
Further, if GCC states worked towards ratifying international declarations and
conventions, they would be provided with a standard for the treatment of immigrants and
migrant laborers. These are pre-packaged policies that have great potential to benefit GCC
states if adopted and implemented.
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5.4 Asian Emigration Policies
Another mechanism that perpetuates the flow of Asian migrants to Gulf countries is
Asian emigration policies. If any actor was to advocate for the protection of the rights of migrant
workers in the Gulf, it would seem that it should be the sending countries. However, because the
majority of immigrant-sending countries are dependent on remittance flows from the Gulf, they
create policies that promote outward flows of migration.
When examining emigration policy, India is an excellent example for many reasons.
Indians make up the largest foreign population group in many GCC countries, and it is one of
the largest contributors to the global stock of migrants. Supporting a surplus labor population,
India is more reliant on remittance inflows than ever. Money flowing from workers in the Gulf
make up a large part of the GDP in some Indian states such as Kerala and Andhra Pradesh (Vora
2013, 27). Because of this reliance, India has crafted emigration policies that make the process
of travelling abroad and remitting money back to India much easier.
The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1973 was created with the purpose of increasing
the flow of remittances from the Gulf to India. The classification of Nonresident Indian (NRI)
was added to categories of Indian residents with the purpose of including migrant workers in
Indian society and allowing them to continue reaping economic benefits without actually living
in India (Vora 2013, 27). NRIs can still contribute to India’s economy through remittances
without receiving the political benefits that an Indian citizen would receive.
In 1999, a new policy created another category for Indians residing outside of the
country called the Person of Indian Origin (PIO). This policy distributed cards to Indians living
abroad with foreign passports in an attempt to include them in India’s economy (Vora 2013,
27). Today, India is exploring dual-citizenship models that would allow Indians who are living
and working abroad to remain a part of India’s society (Vora 2013, 25). This psychologically
promotes feelings of inclusion and instills an attachment to the home country, which in turn
encourages participation, namely economic participation, in society.
Another country that embraces and supports the emigration of their population is The
Philippines. Because of the lack of local employment and job opportunity, the Philippines
recognizes the importance of sending the surplus labor supply abroad. In 1974, the Labor
Code of the Philippines was created as a response to the lack of local employment opportunity
and identified contract labor migration as a viable solution (Modarres 2010, 7). The Labor
Code increased the level of foreign currency and expanded overseas opportunities. In 1982,
the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration was created to oversee the process of
migration due to the sheer number of Filipinos seeking employment abroad (Modarres 2010, 7).
These emigration policies certainly benefit countries who are significantly contributing
to the stock of international migrants economically. However, the desperation for remittances
clouds the priorities in crafting emigration legislation. Countries such as India and the
Philippines continue to promote emigration due to a significant labor surplus, which indirectly
contributes to the abuse of migrant workers abroad. Asian policies that aim to maintain
economic integration of emigrants legitimize the impermanence of migrants in destination
countries and its ramifications that the kafala system produces. In addition, focusing on sending
surplus populations abroad, local governments should ensure that the rights of their citizens are
upheld in destination countries.

5.5 Social and Spatial Segregation of Migrants from Society
So far I have discussed legal mechanisms that promote and perpetuate the ill treatment
of migrant workers living in GCC countries. The kafala system allows GCC countries to
perpetuate the inhumane treatment through ignorance and through locating the management of
migrant laborers at the level of the employer instead of the state. Immigrant-sending countries
contribute to this perpetuation through the promotion of mass emigration of the local population
and supporting the pursuit of seeking work abroad in order to create an employment equilibrium
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in their own countries. Immigrant-sending countries also do little to promote dialogue with
destination countries.15 Finally, international law instruments aim to standardize the rights that
migrants receive on a global scale, which would in effect tame the harsh treatment with which
migrant laborers are met in the Gulf. Though these efforts on the international level are genuine
and provide a framework for change, they hold no legal authority on the domestic level and are
therefore often ignored by GCC countries.
Beyond the legal mechanisms that allow for and promote negative terms of migration to
Gulf countries, there are also inherent social and spatial structures present in Gulf societies that
further contribute to the marginalization of migrant laborers.

5.5.1 The Welfare State and the Benefits of Citizenship
Revenues resulting from the oil boom in the Gulf not only provided the financial
resources to implement expansive development plans, but have also allowed GCC governments
to provide extensive benefits to its citizens. The welfare state present in all GCC countries
instills a mentality of racism, classism, and superiority on the individual level. The root of this
phenomenon is located on the level of the state, as they are generating welfare benefits that are
transferred to national citizens. However, the effects that the welfare state has on the society are
produced by the nationals themselves.
The government begins this process of discrimination by creating rigid boundaries
and classifications between citizens and non-citizens; nationals and non-nationals; Western
expatriates and Asian and African migrant laborers. By instituting these distinct categories that
are based on race and nationality, the government contributes to a racist and classist populace.
The state situates citizens in a superior position by providing housing, health care, a guaranteed
income regardless of employment, and education at all levels (Vora 2013, 10). The wage
disparity based on nationality discussed above is another mechanism used by governments and
companies that transmits a racist mentality to the mindset of the population.
The lack of rights and benefits for non-citizens in GCC countries creates a visible
dichotomy in Gulf society, which allows the citizenry to develop a superior mentality. This
superior mentality can be argued to be one of the causes of the social marginalization of migrant
laborers. Migrants are thought of as a populace on the periphery of society, education, wealth,
and as an inferior group as a whole. I argue that this attitude is a direct result of the rigid class
system based on nationality that the welfare state produces and perpetuates the exploitation of
the labor population.

5.5.2 Wasta
Another mechanism contributing to the citizen-noncitizen dichotomy is a social structure
called wasta. Wasta is an Arabic word literally meaning connection, but can be best described
in its colloquial use as “social capital” (Gardner 2010, 154). Bourdieu describes social capital
as “the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue
of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual
acquaintance or recognition,” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 119). The phenomenon is best
described by one of Andrew Gardner’s informants:
Wasta is a way to get there. When I say that I have a wasta in the Traffic Directorate,
it means that I’ve got somebody there who can help me cut through the red tape.
They can take care of my problem….‘with wasta you can do anything.’ ‘You better
get wasta’ is a very common clause in speech. If you have wasta, you can get it done
in a day. It means you can get it done if you have a way – an intermediary way,
to get in, or someone inside the system. People even talk about Vitamin W – that’s
wasta.

It does not take long to recognize the importance of having wasta in the Gulf. If you don’t
have special connections when trying to get something done, especially with the government,
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the task immediately turns into a significant obstacle when the same problem would be simply
a speed bump for a national.
Wasta is generally reserved for Gulf nationals, and at best, other Arab migrants. Wasta is
obtained through familial, tribal, and sectarian affiliation, meaning that foreigners inevitably lack
this important connection to mobilize their positions in society (Gardner 2010, 155). By using
special connections to get things done, national citizens profit both economically and socially.
Because wasta is distinctly held by nationals, they are inherently situated in an exceptionally
high rung in society, contributing to the superior mentality of nationals. The system of wasta,
whose benefits are exclusive to citizens, makes migrants conscious of their subordinate role
in society, creating a more rigid class system based on nationality and race, which results in a
mentality of exclusion and separation for migrants and non-citizens.

5.5.3 Spatiality and Geography
The final method of constructing a psychological dynamic of separation between citizens
and non-citizens is through the physical exclusion of migrants from the city. The contemporary
infrastructure of Gulf cities is a result of the shift throughout the period of rapid influx of oil
wealth. This shift relocated the centers of Gulf cities from areas based on mercantilism and
regional trade to areas based on tourism and international trade. This shift left migrant laborers,
particularly in the services sector, behind in less developed niches of the city.
The geographical shift to new central areas of the city left migrant laborers on the
physical periphery of Gulf cities. As GCC states modernized and developed, they also became
more expensive places to live. This was not a problem for nationals as they received increasing
benefits, but the hike in the cost of living in central areas pushed the members of lower rungs of
society to the edges of the cities where the cost of living was affordable.
Today, homogenous neighborhoods in Gulf cities serve as testimony to the socially
institutionalized dynamic of separation that both the state and its citizens have created. For
example, in the heart of Dubai, you will find neighborhoods of Emirati families and areas
populated with Western and Arab expatriates, which are off limits to laborers (Bristol-Rhys
2012, 79). In these areas of the city, the only time you may see an Asian or African migrant
will be if they are working in the malls, driving taxis, or perfecting the landscapes that line
the roads. If you travel to the edge of the Dubai, you will find less developed neighborhoods
which house less fortunate Arab and other migrant families. Once you leave Dubai and enter
into neighboring Emirates, here you will find many neighborhoods for migrant workers and
families. In Sharjah, the Emirate neighboring Dubai to the north, streets are full of classified
advertisements for apartments searching for a tenant of a specific nationality. For example, a
specific sign may read “Apartment available for Indian tenant.” As shown in the pictures below,
the quality of life diminishes in areas further removed from the heart of the city.
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Clockwise from right: Dubai Marina, Sara Hamza; Dubai
Marina, Time Out Dubai; Jumeriah, travelmadness.com

Periphery of the City

Both photos taken in Al Rashidiya, an area at the Northern
border of Dubai. Sara Hamza

Volume 6, Issue 1

99

100

HAMZA

Dirt Streets of Sharjah, the Emirate north of Dubai.
Sara Hamza

Ras Al Khaimah, far northern Emirate of the UAE. In the
neighborhood of Al Jazirah Al Hamra, an old coastal town
with a number of development projects underway.
Sara Hamza

Free Trade Zones also serve as a mechanism that produces a segregated society based
on nationality. Free Trade Zones are exceptional areas where businesses and companies are not
required to meet the requirements that are compulsory throughout the rest of the city (Gardner
2010, 140). In these areas, companies are not required to be owned by nationals, so by nature
they attract foreigners. Though these areas provide a haven where foreigners can feel a sense of
belonging, these areas also generate feelings of exclusion through constructing physical areas
exclusive to foreign business investors.
Rapid development and modernization has resulted in a geographical hierarchy with
the center of the city at the top of the pyramid and the peripheral areas at the bottom. The “out
of sight, out of mind” mentality and the drastic hike in rents as a result of modernization and
development has created a spatial structure that places migrant laborers and labor camps on the
very edge of the city.16
By placing labor camps on the periphery of the city, workers are both spatially and
socially insulated from society. The geographical separation is more obvious than the social
segregation that laborers experience. By placing labor camps on the outskirts of the city, it
makes it nearly impossible for laborers to interact with the rest of society. These areas are
generally not served by public transportation, and taxi fares from these areas to the city are
extremely high (Gardner 2010, 66). Even if the workers could afford the taxi fare, their long
and arduous work days and little time off provides another obstacle for workers to venture to
the city. Because of the exhausting nature of their work, laborers tend to find small tea shops in
close proximity to their camps to spend their down time (Gardner 2010, 66).
Social exclusion experienced by laborers is harder to explain than physical exclusion
and relies on testimony from the laborers themselves. In interviews conducted by BristolRhys, she found that workers understand and perceive the geographical separation as a method
of institutionalizing social exclusion. Though the physical marginalization of migrant laborers
makes it difficult for them to interact with the rest of society on a practical level, there are also
unspoken barriers of where workers can and cannot go (Bristol-Rhys 2012, 77). For example,
the laborers are systematically excluded from areas such as malls because they are generally
too expensive “to even purchase a cup of tea,” (Bristol-Rhys 2010, 77). However, laborers

Pursuit: The Journal of Undergraduate Research at the University of Tennessee

Migrant Labor

101

are also socially excluded as they avoid these areas out of a fear of harassment by security
guards. Mall security guards reported that they were instructed to prevent laborers from entering
because “they would just sit on benches and stare at women,” (Bristol-Rhys 2012, 30). This
generalization of the migrant labor population made by locals and Westerners has produced a
social monopoly over certain spatial areas of the city.
There are even socially-constructed barriers that exclude laborers from public areas.
When asked if the workers walked down to the Corniche to sit in the parks, one worker
responded,
No, no, that is too far and it is also too difficult! The police watch you very closely
down there, we have been told, because they don’t want all of the men from the
camps crowding the area. We were told by our company that we should not go there
at all. (Bristol-Rhys 2012, 77).

When Bristol-Rhys asked why the workers felt uncomfortable going to these parks and
other public places, she found that the workers did not understand the concept of public. When
she explained that this meant that they are open to all of the people in the city, the worker
responded, “No, Madam, no, this is not the case because we are not people of the city, we live
in the labor camp and are not public,” (Bristol-Rhys 2012, 77).
The language barrier presents another obstacle to inclusion for migrant laborers.
Companies systematically hire people from different areas in Asia so that they have less in
common both culturally and linguistically (Gardner 2010, 63). India, for example, is home to
hundreds of dialects which can even vary within the same state. The differences in language
both between the laborers and with the local population presents a significant barrier to societal
immersion.
It is important to note that the migrant population in the Gulf is extremely diverse. It
consists mostly of South Asians and other Arab migrants, and smaller minority groups include
Western Europeans and Africans. Religion adds yet another layer of variation within the migrant
population. Religion differs across nationality lines, but also within the same nationality
group. India provides another great example as the Indian diaspora in the Gulf consists of both
Muslims and Hindus. Vora points out that Hindu and Muslim Indians in Dubai felt a sense of
both solidarity and difference with one another. Muslim Hindus feel a sense of belonging to the
ummah, or the global community of Muslims, which generates ideological similarities with the
Islamic state of the UAE. Hindus and Christians often perceived Muslims from South Asia as
having an advantaged position in society due to religion, and that they found more success in
assimilating with Emiratis. However, Muslim Indians do not perceive their religion as benefiting
them in more ways than their Christian and Hindu counterparts (Vora 2013, 83). Variation in
language, religion, and nationality have all worked to create cleavages not only with locals,
but also within the migrant population itself. This heterogeneous population prevents societal
immersion and also presents a barrier of unification of the migrant population. A disengaged
migrant population allows GCC states to exploit workers with ease.
The testimony from the workers interviewed by Bristol-Rhys proves that the exclusive
nature of society in the Gulf has produced a mentality of segregation and separation. In addition
to the state of impermanence that the kafala system institutes, systematic separation created by
the state through free trade zones, exclusive neighborhoods dedicated to certain nationalities,
and extremely high rents in the heart of the city have also resulted in socially constructed and
spatial boundaries. Variation within the migrant population has further contributed to cleavages
both within the group and with the local population. This has ultimately perpetuated the lack
of efficacy in ameliorating the appalling effects of the kafala system. Laborers are conscious
of their role in Gulf societies, and discriminatory policies and rules have shaped the superior
mentality of nationals and the inferior mindsets of migrant laborers.
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6 Case Study: Dubai
Dubai, one of the seven Emirates in the UAE, provides a perfect case study of a Gulf city
that developed at light speed. Located on the shores of the Persian Gulf, the city of Dubai has
become infamous for its iconic, ultramodern architecture, manmade islands, and its futuristic
atmosphere. The discovery of oil is often seen as the distinct catalyst that carried Dubai from
its mercantilist history to its new role as a global player in the realm of tourism, finance, and
real estate. However, the lived experiences during the periods of rapid transformation are often
left out of modernization narratives of Gulf societies. Though discovery of oil certainly played
an important role in the rapid transformation of Dubai from a regional port city to a globally
important trading center, the role that various sub-groups and migrant populations played in this
transformation are integral to Dubai’s iconic presence in contemporary landscapes.
Dubai is known for its luxury and extravagance, but you do not have to travel far to
find contrasting lifestyles. The common images of expatriates are of Westerners seeking taxfree work. The reality is that the majority of expatriates are Arab immigrants and, in greater
numbers, migrant workers from Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent. They provide the
backbone of society and labor to provide the Gulf with its iconic infrastructure.
Dubai serves as the quintessential example of a developed Gulf city, while at the same
time constructs itself as a distinctly different place than anywhere else in the world. Dubai is
a city of dualities and divides, and is home to many political, social, and spatial boundaries
and dichotomies. All of the legal and social mechanisms discussed in the previous sections
have played out in a way that has created rigid boundaries between different social classes,
races, nationalities, and religions. These dichotomies between various populations in Dubai
are perpetuated by the government through rigid distinctions between citizens and residents,
nationals and non-nationals, locals and expatriates, as well as temporary workers largely
from South Asia and Western migrants. These distinctions used in political discourse trickle
down to every level of society. Because the government makes distinctions between different
nationalities and legal statuses, the citizenry follows suit and uses these same distinctions
in commercial enterprise, in the media, and in daily life. This dynamic of exclusivity and
separation in Dubai then trickles down to the migrants themselves, perpetuating feelings of
inferiority, unimportance, and exclusion.
Though the contemporary condition of groups insulated by nationalities and social
status is a result of deep-seated and long standing histories of exclusion, Indians and other
Asian populations have longstanding ties to the Gulf. Though the kafala system excludes these
populations through denying them any form of legal belonging, they have played in integral
role in the development of the city throughout the 20th century. Because they cannot enjoy any
form of legal belonging to the Emirati nation, but simultaneously serve an integral role in the
operation of governance, to national identity and citizenship, and to the functioning of Dubai’s
global market, Neha Vora describes the Indian diaspora in Dubai as a group of “impossible
citizens” (Vora 2013, 3).
Today, nationals have become a minority group in the Emirates. According to government
statistics from 2011, foreigners make up more than 88.5% of the population in the Emirates,
and more than 90% in the Emirate of Dubai (Human Rights Watch 2014). This group is largely
made up of low paid migrant workers from South Asia, who provide the foundation of the
country’s workforce. 95% of the workforce in the United Arab Emirates consists of foreigners
(Human Rights Watch 2006, 7). It is estimated that by 2020, Emirati citizens will account for
less than four percent of the total workforce in the UAE (Janardhan 2011, 98).

6.1 History
Though Dubai’s period of development and modernization was extremely rapid, the
lived experiences during this period are crucial to contextualizing the narrative of Dubai’s
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history. The discovery of oil and the rapid influx of revenues to Gulf monarchies and nationals
have provided the financial resources necessary for modernization. However, the hands that
physically built the iconic infrastructure of Dubai and provided the necessary manpower are
often excluded from the story of modernization. Throughout the 20th century, the migrant
populations that played an integral role in the Dubai’s development have been marginalized and
excluded from the return on the city’s profitable modernization efforts.
Prior to the discovery of oil, Dubai was known as the main trading center of the region
(Ali 2010, 15). Traders and merchants from neighboring countries along the Persian Gulf and
Indian Ocean travelled to Dubai to participate in the trade of pearls and gold. In the early 20th
century, the pearl and gold industry facilitated trade with India, Pakistan, and Persia, which
formed the foundation of the relationships and the initial exchange of populations between
these countries (Ali 2010, 15). During this time period, people were concentrated along the
Dubai Creek due to its geographic importance for trade. This caused commercial and residential
rents to increase, which essentially produced an area exclusive to upper-class individuals and
families while simultaneously marginalizing those who were financially unable to survive in
these areas (Ali 2010, 15). This pattern of the wealthy occupying and monopolizing the citycenter and the marginalization of the less fortunate segments of the population is a recurring
theme throughout Dubai’s history.
After roughly 20 years of economic depression due to the collapse of the pearl trade
industry, Dubai finally saw an upsurge of commercial activity and trade with Indian and Pakistan
in the 1950s (Ali 2010, 15). Because of Dubai’s reliance on trade for economic prosperity,
Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed al Maktoum refocused efforts on developing the city with the aim of
boosting the economy (Ali 2010, 17). Sheikh Rashid plan’s included dredging the creek, which
had become extremely silted in many crucial areas, the building of an international airport, and
the construction of more ports (Ali 2010, 17-18). These projects required more manpower than
Dubai could supply, which initiated the first influx of migrants to Dubai for the specific purpose
of providing labor. Migrants during this period came from India, Pakistan, and Iran. In 1968,
Dubai hosted a population of 65,000, 20-25,000 of which were Iranian, 12,000 Pakistani, and
around 8-10,000 were Indian (Ali 2010, 18). During this time, areas such as Karama and Satwa
were intentionally built as areas of low income housing to house migrant workers. These areas
are still known today as poor parts of the city. This was one of the initial acts of insulating
migrant workers from the rest of society. In previous time periods, traders from South Asian
countries were of a wealthier class than those who were now migrating to supply labor. Because
of their economic class in previous eras, Indian and other Asian merchants lived among Gulf
nationals and were easily assimilated and included in Gulf society.
Around the time of initial development efforts, oil was discovered in Dubai in 1966
(Ali 2010, 26). Oil revenues were not the sole cause of development in Dubai as development
projects were already underway; however, the rapid influx of profit provided the necessary
resources for the Dubai government to continue these projects at a breakneck speed. Oil revenue
not only benefitted the state, but it allowed the Dubai citizenry to experience new, luxurious
existences, which starkly contrasted with previous Bedouin lifestyles (Ali 2010, 27).

6.1.1 Welfare Programs
By the early 1980s, the government experienced enough oil revenue to begin providing
welfare programs to its citizens. These programs have developed over time and continue to
provide significant benefits to the Dubai citizenry. Some of the benefits include schooling up to
the PhD level anywhere in the world, free plots of land, interest-free loans to build a house, and
payments to nationals to marry other nationals. The government provides well-paying jobs to
its nationals, which often require little work, subsidized housing for low income nationals, and
generous charities to nationals who cannot work (Ali 2010, 176-77).
Welfare programs have contributed to the rigid class boundaries in Dubai. Through
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providing generous benefits to citizens and denying non-nationals the same benefits, migrants
are placed outside of the legal framework of the country. There are no processes of naturalization
for migrants in place in the UAE, which not only excludes migrants from legal consideration,
but the mentality of exclusion initiated on the level of the state transcends to the mindset of
Dubai’s population.
The welfare state that has developed in the United Arab Emirates has created a consumer
culture among Emirati nationals, which has produced and perpetuated a status quo where locals
act as consumers and migrants as producers (Ali 2010, 28). The welfare state has fostered a
superior mindset among nationals, which ultimately causes locals to rely on migrants to supply
the manpower for the menial jobs which they view as inferior. Because these jobs, such as those
in the construction sector, are necessary to support the consumer culture in Dubai, Emiratis
remain reliant on an imported labor supply.
The consumer culture in Dubai can be seen in the centrality and importance of malls,
night clubs, fine dining, and luxury hotels (Ali 2010, 9). Malls serve many functions in Gulf
society. They serve as meeting grounds, as an escape from the year-round heat, as ostentatious
displays of wealth and luxury, a tourist destination, and as a central hub of each Gulf city.
In each Gulf city which I visited, the most recommended tourist attractions were the grand
mosque, the souq (market), and the mall. These recommendations highlight some of the most
important aspects of society in Gulf cities: religion and shopping.
The consumer culture, made possible to Emirati citizens through the generous benefits
of the welfare state, has also excluded migrants from the luxurious lifestyles that the consumer
culture supports. In particular, migrant workers are systematically excluded from this lifestyle,
as many Western expatriates already have the resources necessary to participate in similar
patterns of consumption. Many of the mechanisms discussed above (such as low wages for
migrant workers, exclusion from the welfare state, and geographical separation from the city)
are employed in Dubai to socially exclude migrant workers from society.

6.1.2 Free Trade Zones
By the 1980s and 1990s, trade interests in Dubai had expanded. Previous development
efforts initiated by Sheikh Rashid bin Al Maktoum paved the way for Dubai’s emergence
onto the global playing field. A component of these development efforts spurred by Dubai’s
neoliberal policies aiming to attract foreign investment was the creation of free trade zones
scattered throughout the city. Jebel Ali, Dubai’s first industrial free zone, opened in 1980 and
was the first geographical area in the city that operated outside of the legal structure upheld
throughout the rest of Dubai. Because the free zone was not required to abide by the rules and
regulations set forth by the kafala system or the country’s other laws which are rooted in Islamic
principles, Jebel Ali offered 100 percent business ownership, no import duties, minimal capital
requirement, and relaxed work visa regulations (Vora 2013, 46).
The first free trade zone located in Dubai’s Jebel Ali port was extremely successful in
attracting foreign investors and providing them with a way to actively contribute to the economy.
This success initiated the development of a series of other free trade zones which all operated
outside the parameters of the existing legal structure, each with a unique theme ranging from
the service industry, to investment, to media cities (Vora 2013, 46). The relaxed regulations
within these zones attract multi-national companies and Western expatriates interested in
business enterprise in Dubai’s booming economy. Dubai’s recent ascension as an important
global player provided new frontiers for multi-national companies interested in expanding their
global influence.
While free trade zones in Dubai created a new way for foreigners to participate in the
stimulation of the economy, they have simultaneously contributed to the hierarchy of the city
where the employees of the service sector consistently occupy the lowest rungs of society.
Those who supply the manpower for the service sector of the economy, which are primarily
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South Asian minority groups, are marginalized from society through exclusion from areas of the
city which allow foreigners to profit from the booming economy. While free trade zones offer
Western expatriates forms of economic inclusion, those in the service sector, who do not have
the resources necessary to participate in business enterprise, are left on the periphery of the city
geographically, economically, and socially.
This structure allows the government to administer different laws for different segments
of the population. Nationals benefit from welfare assistance and profit from the policies of the
kafala system. Western expatriates benefit from economic opportunities in free-trade zones and
are free to operate outside of the parameters of the legal structure. On the other hand, migrant
groups fall outside the parameters of any benefits or protection from the government which
provide forms of inclusion and belonging to the city, and are also kept in a perpetual state
of inferiority by the rules of the kafala system. Dubai’s neoliberal policies ensure economic
success for nationals and Western expatriates while making it impossible for migrant laborers
to profit from their work.

6.1.3 Tourism
The innovation of the free trade zones beginning in the 1980s initiated an influx of
Westerners and Western-based companies to Dubai. Through the success of free trade zones,
Dubai saw that it could benefit from the diversification of its economy and through opening
up access to those beyond the region. Another mechanism of attracting foreigners to Dubai is
through the development of the tourism industry. Tourism in Dubai has evolved as an artificially
constructed industry through development efforts as Dubai has no natural attraction for tourists.
There are no significant historical landmarks or environmental landscapes unique to the country.
The lack of natural attraction combined with the unbearable heat does not place Dubai on the
top of the list of travel destinations. In order to attract travelers, Dubai has had to construct and
create attractions. The list of these attractions grew rapidly throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and
today all the marvels of Dubai combined together have worked to craft a uniquely iconic city
that tops lists of places to visit.
Before the innovation of the free trade zone and the emergence of the tourism industry
in Dubai, Westerners had little reason to travel to the United Arab Emirates. As Dubai erected
unique and interesting attractions and as the tourism sector developed, more and more Westerners
began travelling to Dubai. By the late 1990s, 200,000 British tourists were travelling to Dubai
annually. During the early 2000s, wealthy South Asians and other Gulf Arabs were travelling in
significant numbers to the country (Ali 2010, 25-6).
However, the development of the tourism industry did not come easily. Because there
is nothing organic about the tourist attractions in Dubai, the development required significant
financial investment, time, and labor. Dubai had the homegrown resources to supply the
financial investment from oil wealth; however, Dubai could not supply its own labor for these
expansive development projects (Ali 2010, 6). Dubai transformed its landscape from sprawling
stretches of desert to a cosmopolitan city within a matter of decades. During the 1960s, Dubai
was still a stretch of desert and was still home to Bedouins living in palm frond huts. The United
Arab Emirates gained independence in 1971, and by this time much of Dubai’s population was
sedentary living in housing blocks. By the 1980s, the United Arab Emirates had developed
and profited enough from oil to begin providing welfare benefits to its citizens (Ali 2010, 27).
Within two decades, the citizenry of the country saw a dramatic shift from a truly traditional
way of life to new lifestyles which supported and consumerism. As of 2010, the tourism industry
accounted for 30% of Dubai’s GDP, and Dubai received roughly 7 million tourists each year
(Ali 2010, 43).
During this period of development, projects to support the tourism industry took priority.
Beginning with Sheikh Rashid’s dredging of the Dubai Creek, the focus had become creating
effective and reliable ways for foreigners to easily travel through the city (Ali 2010, 6). After the
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dredging of the Creek, two massive ports were constructed, and the development of an immense
international airport was initiated (Ali 2010, 6). Today, the Dubai International Airport is central
to the country’s importance in the global sphere. The airport serves as a link between Europe
and South Asia to the Middle East and Africa (Ali 2010, 6). The International Airport was the
seventh most travelled airport in the world in 2013, and had the highest growth rate among
the top ten most travelled airports (15.2% growth from 2012). Further, the Dubai International
Airport ranked fifth in the world based on revenue freight plus mail. (The Port Authority of New
York & New Jersey 2013, 58).
The development of Dubai’s International Airport goes hand-in-hand with the business
enterprise of the Emirates Airline. Emirates Airline was launched in 1985, and has since been
notorious for its luxurious flights (Ali 2010, 21). Dubai’s flagship airline allows the country to
further profit from flights to and from its international airport, and serves as an example of the
luxury that Dubai has to offer throughout the world. The airline’s expansion to new cities has
grown steadily since its inception, and this growth mirrors the increasing role of Dubai as both
a tourist destination and a central hub linking Europe with the Middle East, South Asia, and
Africa.
The international airport and Emirates Airline provided the necessary foundations on
which the tourism industry could grow. Sayed Ali asserts that the tourism industry is built upon
the two pillars of shopping and hedonism (Ali 2010, 43). The development of the city as a global
shopping center was also central in crafting Dubai as a travel destination (Ali 2010, 43). It does
not take much time in the country to recognize the importance and centrality of shopping in
society. Malls serve a social importance in Gulf society, extending beyond their basic function
of providing a place to consume goods. Dubai has worked to cultivate the centrality of shopping
in society, and shopping and consumerism have therefore become significant aspects of culture
in Dubai and across the Gulf.
Today, Dubai is home to over forty malls, many of which have a unique theme that
differentiates them from any other shopping center (Ali 2010, 44). The Dubai Mall is the biggest
in the world, the Mall of the Emirates has an indoor ski slope, and Mercato Mall is designed
to look like a Venetian city. In 1996, the Dubai government established the Dubai Shopping
Festival (DSF), an extravagant shopping and entertainment event which features coordinated
shopping sales across the city, discounts, and no sales tax. The Festival not only encourages
consumerism among the local population, but also attracts tourists from around the world. The
Festival drew 1.6 million visitors in its first year, and has continued to attract tourists since
(Ali 2010, 23). The Festival is a brilliant marketing strategy that promotes consumption among
locals and attracts tourists, which ultimately achieves the goal of stimulating the economy.
Another man-made attraction in Dubai has been the plethora of luxurious nightclubs,
hotels and fine dining restaurants. Nearly all of the hotels constructed in the recent past are four
and five star hotels, setting a precedent for the luxury which Dubai has to offer. Topping the list
of these luxury hotels is the Burj al-Arab, the sail-shaped hotel built on an artificial island in
1999 (Ali 2010, 52). The hotel is often called the “only seven star hotel” in the world, though the
technicalities of the star rating are disputed. Rooms begin at $1,000 a night, which reserves the
space for the extremely wealthy and famous passing through Dubai. The hotel serves as one of
the most iconic structures in the Dubai skyline, and though the quality of the hotel exceeds the
means of the average person, the sail-shaped silhouette in the sky means something to everyone
in Dubai. The hotel is rumored to lose money due staggering prices, however the value of the
hotel is in its ability to brand Dubai as a luxurious travel destination (Ali 2010, 52).
The unparalleled nightlife serves the same purpose as the luxurious hotels in Dubai. As
one club owner put it, “We’re like the Miami of the Middle East. It’s all about showing up in
the best car, getting the best table and sharing the biggest bottle of Cristal with the best-looking
girls,” (Ali 2010, 45-6).
Though not everyone in Dubai consumes the services of the ultra-luxurious hotels and
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restaurants, they still play a significant role and create the ability to say “Dubai has the only
seven star hotel in the world,” or “Dubai has the tallest building in the world.” The overarching
strategy used to market Dubai as a top travel destination has been to create the biggest, the
best, and to set records signaling luxury throughout the world. Through creating a luxurious
haven contrasting with the rest of the Middle East, Dubai has achieved its goal of attracting
Western tourists and professional expatriates. Sayed Ali argues that without the nightlife scene
geared toward a Western audience, it would have been unlikely that so many Westerners would
have travelled to Dubai in the first place because of the strict laws based on Islamic principles
throughout the country (Ali 2010, 45).17

6.1.4 Development, Construction Boom and its Effects on Migrant Labor
The previous section gives an idea of just how rapid, systematic, and expansive Dubai’s
development efforts were. Within a matter of decades, Dubai emerged from a sprawling stretch
of desert to a cosmopolitan city featuring some of the most distinct structures in the world.
Today, Dubai is home to the tallest building in the world, the biggest mall, two sets of manmade islands shaped like palm trees, an artificial archipelago resembling the world map, one of
the most travelled airports, and the only seven star hotel in the world.18
This same development trajectory has taken centuries for other countries to achieve. It is
clear that oil wealth has assisted in this light speed expansion, however Dubai does not have the
homegrown resources to support this growth without the help from its neighboring countries.
Though the government provided the financial resources necessary for these development
projects, Dubai has historically hosted a small population size, which has produced a labor
defecit. Because neighboring countries such as India and the Philippines have the opposite
problem of hosting a labor surplus, the countries create a compatible conduit of labor migration.
Within two years after the discovery of oil, Emirati national citizens in Dubai were
already slightly in the minority (Ali 2010, 26). Indians have made up the largest national group
in Dubai since the beginning of the development era. Though Indians were present in Dubai as
merchants before the 20th century, Dubai’s demand for labor significantly increased the density
of the India-UAE migration conduit. By the 1970s, Indians accounted for the third largest group
in the UAE, with a population of 102,000 of a total 656,000 population (Ali 2010, 28). Today,
Indians account for almost 40 percent of the population of Dubai (Ali 2010, 29).
Development efforts and the demand for import labor created a massive construction
boom in Dubai. During the early 2000s, the construction sector was a leading contributor to
the economic growth of the country (Human Rights Watch 2006). Between 2000 and 2004,
the construction sector’s contribution to GDP grew by 23%, with an annual growth rate of 5%.
Today, construction workers account for one-fourth of the population of Dubai and
experience many of the injustices discussed in the “Treatment of Workers” section (Ali 2010,
83). They are paid extremely low wages that are often withheld, their passports are confiscated,
they arrive to the country with preexisting debt to recruitment agencies, they are forced to live in
unsanitary labor camps located on the periphery of the city, labor unions are prohibited, and the
workers suffer financial and health ramifications due to the cyclical nature of labor migration
that the kafala system instills. In the next section, I will discuss how these injustices play out on
the ground in Dubai with the example of the construction of the Burj Khalifa.

6.2 Spotlight on the Burj Khalifa
Emaar, one of the largest real estate companies in Dubai, announced in 2003 its plan
to construct the tallest building in the world. By 2004, construction of what was then called
the Burj Dubai began in the heart of the city at a staggering pace. However, the needle-shaped
building dominating Dubai’s skyline was not finished until 2010 due to the economic crisis that
struck in 2009 (Malik 2011).
The plan to build the tallest building in the world was not an absurd proposal. In fact, the
project fit in quite neatly with other development plans in Dubai. At the same time, extravagant
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plans to build Palm Jumeirah, Dubai World, and Dubailand were already underway.19 The
proposal and execution of these projects all contributed to the construction boom in the early
2000s, and ultimately placed a great demand for an import labor supply.
The Burj Khalifa serves a greater purpose than standing as the tallest building in the
world. The building is symbolic of Dubai’s emerging prowess in the world on many different
levels. The official website of the Burj Khalifa states:
[The Burj Khalifa is] more than just the world’s tallest building, Burj Khalifa is an
unprecedented example of international cooperation, symbolic beacon of progress,
and an emblem of the new, dynamic and prosperous Middle East. It is tangible
proof of Dubai’s growing role in a changing world. In fewer than 30 years, this city
has transformed itself from a regional centre to a global one. This success was not
based on oil reserves, but on reserves of human talent, ingenuity and initiative. Burj
Khalifa embodies that vision (Emaar Properties PJSC)

However, behind the façade of the symbolic presence of the Burj Khalifa exists the lives
of an overlooked sub-population. The Burj Khalifa aims to represent luxury, cosmopolitanism,
and modernism. However, the story of its construction represents capitalism at its finest,
exploitation of an import labor population, and the deep-seated racist mindset that is everpresent in Dubai. Luxury in Dubai has come at the expense of the lives of migrant laborers who
go to great extents to send money home to their families. In the process, migrant laborers fall
in the trap of the kafala system, which keeps them in a perpetual state of debt, marginalization,
and inferiority in Emirati society.

6.2.1 Construction
The construction of the Burj Khalifa was truly an international collaboration, with 60
contracting and consulting companies and over 12,000 workers representing more than 100
nationalities (Construction Week 2010). At the time of its completion, 22 million man hours
were expended on the construction of the building (Construction Week 2010). Arabtec, the
largest construction company in the UAE, was one of the three main contractors of the project.
Though there is not much information about the treatment of laborers exclusively at the site of
the Burj Khalifa, we can infer the treatment and living conditions of these workers from BBC’s
Panorama report in April 2009. As discussed in an earlier section, the program exposed the
failure of Arabtec to provide sanitary living conditions for its 60,000 workers. Heaps of feces
were piled in the toilets, and raw sewage had leaked all over the camp (Ali 2010, 92).
Not only were workers forced to live in unsanitary conditions, but they were also forced
worked an extraordinary amount for unlivable wages. The average worker at the Burj Khalifa
site toiled 12 hours each day, 6 days a week, for $4 per day (Migrant Rights 2010). While UAE
Labor Law requires all workers to take a break between 12:30 and 3:00 PM due to the merciless
heat, many testimonials claim that workers were not always given this break. At the end of each
day, workers were loaded onto busses that would transport them back to the labor camps.

6.2.2 Protests and Riots
Low wages, the perilous working environment, and living conditions for construction
workers at the Burj Khalifa created high tensions between the workers and their companies.
Throughout the duration of the construction, worker grievances culminated in a number of riots
and strikes in an attempt to voice discontent with the inhuman condition in which they were
living. Discontent at this major construction site echoed throughout the city and encouraged a
number of protests at other sites.
Between May and December of 2005, the UAE government reports that at least eight
major strikes took place in Dubai (Human Rights Watch 2006, 24). In September 2005, around
1,000 workers from Al Hamed Development and Construction20 banded together and blocked
Dubai’s main highway in protest of their unpaid wages. If you have ever been on Sheikh Zayed
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Road, the longest highway in the Emirates stretching from Abu Dhabi to the Northern emirate
of Ras Al Khaimah, you know that there doesn’t need to be a human blockage for chaos to
ensue. During peak hours, the highway becomes so congested naturally that a twenty minute
commute can turn into a journey lasting over an hour. Needless to say, a human blockage of
the road served as an effective cry for help, and the faces that usually remained on the sidelines
were now on center stage.
As a response to this protest, Minister of Labor Ali bin Abdullah Al Kaabi stepped in
and demanded that Al Hamed pay the delayed wages “within the next 24 hours” (Human Rights
Watch 2006, 31). The local media depicted this action as Dubai’s commitment to upholding the
country’s labor laws. However, testimony of how the aftermath of the strike played out tells a
different story. As discussed above, a Pakistani worker told Human Rights Watch that only two
of the four months of delayed wages were paid, and another month of wages were withheld
since the protest. The government didn’t fine the company even though withholding wages is
illegal in the UAE, and the government didn’t follow up after demanding that the wages be paid.
Further, the leaders of the strike were deported to their home countries (Human Rights Watch
2006, 31).
Though the UAE prohibits unions and strikes, the construction workers must determine
the cost of remaining silent. The Al Hamed Pakistani worker told Human Rights Watch:
“Among ourselves, we argued that either we will get deported because of our strike action or it
will result in recovering our unpaid wages. We didn’t have a choice; we were willing to risk it,”
(Human Rights Watch 2006, 31).
By March 2006, conditions for workers at the Burj Khalifa in a large scale protest at
the construction site. In accordance with previous protests, the discontent voiced in 2006 cited
inhumane working and living conditions and low wages (Human Rights Watch 2006, 37).
On March 21, 2006, workers had been waiting for their bus to transport them back to their
camps as they did every day. After the busses were delayed for several hours, the aggravation
quickly escalated to a violent protest. Nearly 2,500 workers rioted that day, and after hours of
waiting to be taken home some of the protesters began assaulting security officers, breaking into
offices, smashing computers, and destroying cars and construction machines (Whitaker 2006).
An Indian worker present at the protests told Human Rights Watch:
On March 21, it was mostly the new workers who rioted. They were stressed
because after we finish our shift, it takes over an hour to punch out. On that day, the
busses were delayed for hours. The workers started to complain. The company’s
security forces started to harass them and abuse them verbally. This provoked the
rioting. The new workers were demanding pay raises (Human Rights Watch 2006,
37).

In May 2006, workers employed by Besix, one of the three main contractors for the
construction of the Burj Khalifa, staged a strike calling for better wages. On May 16th, Over
8,000 workers refused to work until their demands were met. In response to the protest, the
government deported 50 Besix workers who refused to return to work (Human Rights Watch
2006, 38).
Another unconventional but certainly bold form of protest in Dubai has been suicide.
In 2011, an Indian cleaner jumped from the heights of the Burj Khalifa 10 months after its
opening after being denied his promised holiday time (Malik 2011). The Indian worker could
have taken his life in a number of ways, but choosing to jump from Dubai’s iconic Burj Khalifa
was a deliberate act of protest. Suicide in this case serves the dual purpose of escaping the harsh
reality for the Indian worker and bringing the issue to the forefront of national and international
dialogue. The story gained a significant amount of media coverage, attention that likely would
not have followed if the worker had committed suicide elsewhere.

Volume 6, Issue 1

110

HAMZA

In the aftermath of the Burj Khalifa suicide, the Indian consulate in Dubai revealed that
at least two Indians in Dubai commit suicide each week (Malik 2011). In 2005 alone, 84 Indian
nationals committed suicide (Human Rights Watch 2006, 44). Human Rights Watch detailed
the suicides of two other Indians in Dubai, both with similar discontents. Julfikar Korani hung
himself in the bathroom of Dubai’s largest labor camp, Sonapar (Human Rights Watch 2006,
46). Julfikar’s monthly wage was $190 per month, and records showed that he was only paid for
one of the six months that he had been working. Julfikar had taken a loan of $2,000 to obtain
a work visa, and was required to pay back $140 per month (Human Rights Watch 2006, 46).
Because Julfikar could not possibly pay this amount back and still have enough money to live,
he was falling behind on his payments, placing a significant financial burden on his shoulders.
Dr. Shiv Prakash, a psychiatrist at the New Medical Center and Hospital in Dubai,
commented on the recurrence of suicide among migrant laborers in Construction Week:
When these workers reach here they realize what they have gotten themselves into
and see that they’ve lost everything, they react to it. They feel trapped as they know
that they can’t go back either. There’s no escape. They know they are in a bonded
type of situation and are reacting to what they think is the biggest mistake in their
life, an irreparable loss. It is the reaction to this loss which can lead to suicidal
contemplation (Human Rights Watch 2006, 47).

7 Conclusion
The kafala system is the obvious culprit of the complications involving labor migration
in the GCC. It provides the foundations on which states can build to exploit this sub-population,
which further produces other social mechanisms of exclusion and marginalization in society.
While development and modernization are still largely characterized by the exploitation of
the migrant population, there have been some reform movements since the turn of the 21st
century. Because of the authoritative nature of GCC governments, many of these have been
social movements which are often excluded from the political sphere. However, some GCC
governments have made headway on ameliorating the negative consequences of the kafala
system.
Bahrain has been the only country to do away with the kafala system entirely. In August
2009, the government decided that it wanted to take control of the regulation of the migrant
labor population and eliminate the middleman required by the sponsorship system. In a bold
public statement, the Minister of Labor compared the system to slavery (Janardhan 2011, 117).
Though there are still remnants of the kafala system in Bahrain, this is a positive first step and
sets a good example for other GCC countries.
GCC countries have also faced some pressure from immigrant-sending countries. In
2008, several Asian countries pressed the GCC to establish a minimum wage for its migrant
labor population. However, the GCC ignored this proposal (Janardhan 2011, 120).
Other movements calling for migration reform in the Gulf have existed in the sphere
of social media. Though they have few followers, several groups on Facebook have voiced
concern about the migrant labor situation in the Gulf and call for reform. Some of these groups
are titled “Minimum Wage for Dubai Construction Workers,” “GCC Human Rights,” and
“Dubai’s Dirty Little Secret.”
Others include humanitarian groups and information clearinghouses. Helping Hands
UAE is a secular humanitarian group that aims to help the most underprivileged and exploited
segments of society. This group was founded by British expatriates, and works to supply food
and clothing to laborers in camps and to housemaids (Helping Hands UAE). The Migrant
Rights website seeks to provide a reliable source of information about migrant workers in the
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Middle East. Through organizing campaigns and publishing op-eds, the group hopes to advance
the rights of migrant workers and to break the silence surrounding the abuses of workers’ basic
human rights (Migrant Rights).
Finally, the governments themselves have responded to the abundance of complaints
regarding the kafala system. In 2005, the Dubai Police established a Human Rights Department
in an attempt to address labor disputes between employees and their employers. Once the
worker files a complaint, the Department contacts the employer and mediates a joint meeting
between the two parties. If no agreement is reached, the case is then referred to the Ministry of
Labor. The Human Rights Department has been successful in collecting unpaid wages, however
it has no binding legal powers to enforce its decisions. There is no guarantee that once the case
is resolved by the Department that the employer will actually respond accordingly or pay full
wages in the future (Human Rights Watch 2006, 54). The phenomenon is seen in the case of Al
Hamed discussed above.
Later in 2005, the Government of Dubai also established a Permanent Committee on
Labor Affairs (PCLA) to mediate labor disputes. Between March and December of 2005,
19,249 workers filed complaints, and the PCLA resolved nearly 20,000 cases of unpaid wages.
Committee inspectors also visited 36 labor camps during this period, 75% of which were found
to be well below government standards (Human Rights Watch 2006, 54).
While these new departments are steps in the right direction, they are what David
Mendicoff calls “ad hoc accommodations.” Governments prefer informal regulation that treats
the problems after they already happen over regulatory legal policies that would prevent the
problems in the first place (Mendicoff 2012, 194). Through avoiding the establishment of
regulatory policies, the governments allow the kafala system to continue regulating the migrant
labor population.
Though they have not taken any real steps in reforming the regulation of migration,
governments appear willing to talk. In September 2005, 11 source countries met with nine
destination countries at the Abu Dhabi Dialogue to discuss a collaborative approach of
managing short-term labor. Source countries include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, India,
Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, The Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. The destination
countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, United
Arab Emirates, and Yemen. The Abu Dhabi Dialogue Group (ADDG) was officially established
in 2008, and since conducts regular meetings to foster dialogue between sending and receiving
countries. The focus of the Dialogue is to promote the welfare of the workers themselves
through fostering inter-governmental cooperation (Martin 2012, 229).
GCC governments have also responded to the growing migrant population on other
fronts. Because all six GCC countries are characterized by a demographic imbalance where
local populations constitute a small minority of the total population, there has been an effort
to systematically “Arabize” their cultures. Hosting large and diverse foreign populations, these
countries have experienced the dilution of local culture. States fear that the enormous migrant
presence poses a threat to local culture and may foster erasures of the past. Governments have
established efforts to develop aspects of local culture that are purified from any foreign influence
in an attempt to distinguish themselves from the migrant population. Because the Gulf States are
relatively young, there is an absence of a strong sense of national identity. The governments of
the GCC have worked to establish heritage projects and other displays of culture in an attempt
to create ties between locals and their heritage (Vora 2013, 12-13).
The Arabian Gulf has come a long way in the matter of a few decades. Sprawling
stretches of desert have been replaced with cosmopolitan cities, and the Gulf has transformed
from a regional trading center to a globally important region. These transformations have come
with a price, however, and we must take into account all aspects of the modernization story.
GCC countries continue to exploit the migrant labor population through their use of the kafala
system, which allows for exploitation and grave human rights abuses. This sub-population
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often remains on the periphery of Gulf societies in many ways. Not only are they physically
marginalized from Gulf cities, but they are also socially and politically excluded from society.
GCC governments should work to reform the system of regulation of the migrant population,
to provide forms of inclusion, and to ameliorate the appalling conditions under which migrant
laborers are living. Further, immigrant-sending countries should play a more dominant role in
ensuring the rights of their citizens in Gulf countries.
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Endnotes
1. From here on out, the Arabian Gulf will be referred to as the Gulf. This refers to the area of GCC
countries before they were formalized as modern states.
2. The Indian subcontinent refers to the Southern region of Asia that projects into the Indian Ocean,
including India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
3. Sheikhdom refers to a geographical area that is ruled by a sheikh, or a local ruler.
4. The next largest sector of non-national employment housework (i.e. maids).
5. The first was Bangladesh to India; the 9th was India to Saudi Arabia. DESA International Migration
2013: Migrants by Origin and Destination
6. Most of the population statistics produced by the government are broken down by national/non-national
categories, so it is difficult to find information on the population broken down by specific nationalities.
However, the East African diaspora is visible In Gulf society. For example, I had encounters with many
Kenyans and Ugandans who were employed in the service sector. Further, there was a significant West
African population in the student body at the American University.
7. This will be discussed in a later section.
8. Note that the numbers for non-nationals also include Western expatriates who likely skew the data
upward. Western expats are in a position to own and operate companies, where Asian migrant workers have
less social and professional mobility.
9. I looked at Public administration because the majority of nationals are employed by the public sector.
10. This is likely true across the GCC, but I have not examined each country’s laws regarding labor.
11. Strikes in the UAE due to withheld wages will be discussed in the case study of Dubai.
12. Jumeirah is a coastal residential area in Dubai known for its exceptional beaches and living areas.
Because of its reputation as one of the nicest areas of Dubai, it is one of the most expensive places to live
in the city.
13. The construction of the Burj Khalifa will be discussed in greater detail in the case study of Dubai.
14. With the exception of the free trade zones, which will be discussed later in the paper.
15. The same can be said for immigrant-receiving countries.
16. Refer to the map of major labor camps in Dubai.
17. It is important to note that Islam bans the consumption of alcohol. Though it is not rare to find a Muslim
enjoying the nightlife scene, the comprehensive effort to create an established club scene in Dubai was
geared exclusively toward Westerners.
18. Again, this accolade is rooted in hearsay.
19. Some of these projects would never come to fruition due to the economic crisis in 2009.
20. Al Hamed Development and Construction is one of the leading local construction companies in the
UAE
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